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Institutional Change and the Continuity of Law
PETER L. LINDSETH
This contribution offers reflections on Richard Kay’s theoretical and
historical scholarship regarding processes of institutional (and, by extension,
constitutional) change. The focus here is on Kay’s 2014 legal-historical
monograph, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law. Kay’s analysis
draws theoretical inspiration primarily (though hardly exclusively) from an
Anglo-American tradition, based particularly on the work of H. L. A. Hart. This
Essay argues that Kay’s Hartian approach ultimately depends on a somewhat
strained distinction between law and non-law in processes of change that does not
map well onto the historical record that Kay otherwise cogently analyzes. Kay is
forced, therefore, to supplement his Hartian framework with a distinction between
the “axiological” underpinnings of a revolution (be they social, political, or
cultural) and its “legal” manifestation, i.e., the replacement of an old rule of
recognition with a new one. In doing so, Kay’s analysis begins to point toward
more complex dynamics of change that this Essay argues are more robustly
captured by an alternative theoretical framework drawn from a more French
tradition. Kay’s analysis resonates in particular with the institutional theory of
Maurice Hauriou, who was also among the greatest administrative law scholars in
France over the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. This Essay explores
how Hauriou’s institutional theory could reinforce Kay’s work in this area, using
the example of Kay’s seminal 2011 article, Constituent Authority, to demonstrate
the potential connections. The Essay then returns to Kay’s analysis of the Glorious
Revolution, arguing that the effort of its protagonists to retain the language of law
and to operate within its forms was arguably a vindication of Hauriou’s central
insight about the crucial role of law in allowing revolutionary change to achieve
legitimacy and durable institutionalization over time.
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Institutional Change and the Continuity of Law
PETER L. LINDSETH *
INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure, along with so many distinguished scholars, to
have this opportunity to contribute to a special issue in honor of our very
own Rick Kay. Our focus, of course, is on Rick’s scholarship, and I will
turn to that topic in a moment. At the outset, however, I would be remiss
not to note how grateful we all are at UConn School of Law for Rick’s
many contributions to our scholarly community over nearly a half-century.
In my own case, as a younger academic trying to break into law teaching, I
was fortunate to have Rick as my “shepherd” during my call-back on
campus two decades ago. His careful handling of me on that fateful day, I
like to think, helped pave the way for me eventually joining this faculty,
and for that reason alone I owe him a special debt of gratitude. Rick,
however, has been a “shepherd” to so many of us, not merely at UConn but
also in the broader world of comparative law.1 He has been a model of
academic citizenship and a source of wise counsel over many decades. It is
thus altogether fitting and proper that the Connecticut Law Review should
open its pages to this most well-deserved Festschrift, as a sign of our
collective sense of appreciation and thanks.
Rick’s scholarly achievements are many and varied, but I would like to
focus here on his contributions to the field of comparative public law, and
more particularly to the theoretical dimension of that field. In principle,
Rick and I both specialize in comparative public law, he as a leader in its
now flourishing constitutional branch, and I in its newer and perhaps less
studied administrative off-shoot. But in many ways the two subfields are
quite distinct, at least in terms of who populates them and the literature
each group produces. In this sense, comparative constitutional and
administrative law are built on different “epistemic communities,” as

*
Olimpiad S. Ioffe Professor of International and Comparative Law; Director of International
Programs; Co-Director, Program in Corporate and Regulatory Compliance, University of Connecticut
School of Law. I would like to thank Yaniv Roznai for organizing this Festschrift and inviting me to
take part. Thanks also go to Maxwell Berteletti, currently a third-year student at UConn School of Law,
for his able research assistance.
1
His leadership in the field is most tangibly reflected in his current role as President of the
American Society of Comparative Law. ASCL Executive Board, AM. SOC’Y COMP. L.,
https://ascl.org/about/officers/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020).
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international-relations theorists might put it. Rick and I have no doubt
overlapped loosely in the study of certain aspects of European integration,3
and we have also had the chance to share manuscripts from time to time
and also cite each other on occasion.4 But, given the distinctly different
sets of interlocutors that make up our two respective subfields, we have
probably not engaged with each other’s work as directly or as deeply as we
might have liked (or at least that is certainly true in my case).
This is unfortunate for one simple reason: Upon closer inspection, it is
clear that Rick and I share a common interest in certain threshold
theoretical questions. The most important of these, I would submit, relate
to how governing institutions (and by extension, constitutions) are founded
and change over time, as well as how law and legal rhetoric impact those
processes.
In approaching these questions, Rick draws his theoretical inspiration
primarily (though hardly exclusively)5 from an Anglo-American tradition,
based particularly on the work of H. L. A. Hart.6 My theoretical
inspiration, on the other hand, comes from a more French tradition,
drawing primarily from the work of Maurice Hauriou.7 Because so little of
Hauriou’s thinking has found its way into English (apart from old
translations of excerpts and slivers here and there),8 his work has received
relatively little attention in scholarly discussions in the English-speaking
2

See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L. ORG. 1 (1992).
3
See, e.g., MARK W. JANIS, RICHARD S. KAY & ANTHONY W. BRADLEY, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2008); PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY:
RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE NATION-STATE (2010).
4
See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 752 n.198 (2011)
(citing LINDSETH, supra note 3); Peter L. Lindseth, The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism,
22 EUR. L.J. 696, 708 n.42 (2016) (citing Kay, supra, at 716).
5
One need only read, for example, the range of authors on which Rick draws in Constituent
Authority, supra note 4, to gain the full breadth of his theoretical influences.
6
See Richard S. Kay, Preconstitutional Rules, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 188 & n.4 (1981)
(explaining Hart’s constitutional theory and opining that it is “powerful and enlightening”); see also
Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Change and Wade’s Ultimate Political Fact, 35 U. QUEENSLAND L.J.
31, 37 (2016) (explaining Hart’s analysis of the “rule of recognition”); Richard S. Kay, Legal Rhetoric
and Revolutionary Change, 7 CARIBBEAN L. REV. 161, 181–82 & n.45 (1997) (citing H. L. A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91, 116–23 (2d ed. 1994) in analyzing the Southern secession crisis
preceding the U.S. Civil War).
7
See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’: Explorations Along the
Institutional-Constitutional Frontier, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BRIDGING
IDEALISM AND REALISM 60, 62–64 (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2017) (citing Hauriou’s theories as the
“starting point” for understanding institutional change). Portions of this Essay draw on this book
chapter.
8
See, e.g., THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS: MAURICE HAURIOU, GEORGES RENARD, JOSEPH T.
DELOS (Albert Broderick ed., Mary Welling trans., 1970) (containing English translations of several
works by Hauriou) [hereinafter THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS]. More recently, see MAURICE
HAURIOU, TRADITION IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (Christopher Berry Gray trans., 2011) (translating MAURICE
HAURIOU, LA SCIENCE SOCIALE TRADITIONNELLE (1896)).
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world. That too is unfortunate, and not just because Hauriou was among
the greatest administrative law scholars of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. Rather, more importantly for our purposes,
Hauriou was also the progenitor of what he called the “theory of the
institution and the foundation.”9 Perhaps better than any other theorist,
Hauriou understood how the transformation of “the real into the right”
served as the very foundation of public law, whether administrative or
constitutional.10 Rick and I are both fascinated by these sorts of liminal
situations between real and right, in which social facts—economic,
political, cultural, historical, ideological—are somehow transformed into
authoritative law for a particular community. Such a transformation, of
course, can be understood as giving rise to a new “rule of recognition” in a
Hartian sense (Rick’s view), or to a new “institution” as Hauriou would
have put it (my view). In either case, out of that transformation can come a
particular and fundamental kind of “right”—ultimately a “constitution”—
for a particular political community. Each of us puzzle over what precisely
this means, both in socio-historical and legal terms.11
Part I of this Essay explores Rick’s approach to this question by
looking at his understanding of the relationship of law to processes of
revolutionary change. The primary vehicle for this opening discussion is an
examination of the theoretical dimension of Rick’s recent and fascinating
2014 legal-historical monograph, The Glorious Revolution and the
Continuity of Law (hereinafter GRCL).12 The discussion further explores
how, in approaching the question of law and revolutionary change, Rick
struggles to remain faithful to his Hartian framework. The problem is that
this framework ultimately depends on a distinction between the interior
and exterior of the legal system that does not map well onto his historical
evidence. Thus, as a supplement to his Hartian framework, Rick introduces
the distinction between the “axiological” underpinnings of a revolution (be
they social, political, or cultural) and its “legal” manifestation, i.e., the
replacement of an old rule of recognition with a new one. In doing so,
Rick’s analysis begins to point us toward more complex dynamics in
processes of revolutionary change that I would argue are more robustly
captured by Hauriou’s theory of the institution.
9
Maurice Hauriou, The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism,
in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS, supra note 8, at 93.
10
Maurice Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 813,
815 (1918).
11
Compare Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 715 (“What makes a constitution a
constitution?”), with Peter Lindseth, The Metabolic Constitution and the Limits of EU Legal Pluralism,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LEGAL PLURALISM IN EU LAW 223 (Gareth Davies & Matej Avbelj eds.,
2018) (“What does it mean for power to be ‘constituted’? What are the normative or practical
implications of this ‘constitutional’ phenomenon?”).
12
RICHARD S. KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE CONTINUITY OF LAW (2014).
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Part II then explores Hauriou’s theory in more detail, drawing linkages
between it and Rick’s work. The discussion begins, however, not with
Hauriou but with Rick’s seminal 2011 article, Constituent Authority.13 In
that piece, Rick confronts squarely the question whether “successful
constitution-making must involve something more than the expression
of will”14—again one of those liminal situations at the boundary between
law’s seeming interior and exterior. As Part II will show, consistent with
Rick’s position in Constituent Authority, Hauriou also finds it implausible
that “constituted law” is merely a matter of will, force, or power—or, as
Hauriou once put it, “an attack that has succeeded.”15 All institutions,
Hauriou theorized, begin with some kind of exercise of will. But thereafter,
he posited, they must “put [themselves] in harmony with the conscience of
jurisprudence,”16 thus suggesting that exercises of power and law are
inextricably intertwined. Part II builds on Hauriou’s approach to advance a
theory of institutional (and by extension constitutional) change across three
dimensions—functional, political, and cultural—whose complex
interaction, as well as potential reconciliation, help us better understand the
foundations of stable social, political, and legal order over time.
This Essay then concludes, in Part III, by returning to the role of law in
this overarching process. Despite Rick’s intense focus on law in his work,
he is surprisingly ambivalent about its role. As he describes in the
introduction to GRCL—somewhat jarringly—the English revolutionaries
of 1688-89 “crammed irregular decisions into the regular forms; they
described illegal actions with legal terminology. In short, they faked it.”17
One might take this as an expression of a deep (perhaps even
overwhelming) skepticism toward the purported “continuity of law” at the
heart of the account advanced in GRCL. Was it really a “fake” continuity
after all, given that, consistent with a Hartian framing, it ultimately entailed
the replacement of the prevailing rule of recognition? If so, then perhaps
GRCL is misleadingly titled. Perhaps it is really an account of legal
rupture, as well as about the manner in which legal-sounding rhetoric can,
in the right circumstances, be used to mask that rupture, to create a sense of
comforting continuity where little or none in fact exists. Part III argues,
however, that it is precisely the effort to retain the language of law and to
operate within its forms that differentiates the change wrought by the
Glorious Revolution from other political transformations that ultimately
proved more fragile. This, I would suggest, is a vindication of both of
Rick’s title as well as Hauriou’s central insight about the crucial role of
13

Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 721–22.
Id. at 721.
15
Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816.
16
Id.
17
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17.
14
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law in allowing revolutionary change to achieve legitimacy and durable
institutionalization over time.
I. LEGAL RHETORIC, AXIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS, AND
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE
In GRCL, Rick focuses on what he sees as “the distortion of legal
concepts” inherent in a process of revolutionary change, as well as how
those distortions can “influence[] the actions, the institutions, and the
rhetoric of the new settlement.”18 In doing so, Rick is in fact returning to a
topic that he had first explored nearly two decades previously, in a 1997
article aptly entitled Legal Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change.19
In that earlier piece, Rick had placed the English revolutionaries of
1688-89 at one end of an analytical spectrum, as self-perceived agents of a
deeper legality against the asserted illegality of the government they sought
to overthrow.20 In such a “legalist revolution,” as Rick would later put it,21
it was only natural for the protagonists “to connect their actions . . . to the
artifacts of the legal system they [were] displacing.”22 At the opposite end
of Rick’s analytical spectrum were, quite fittingly, the Bolshevik
revolutionaries in 1917 Russia, who saw themselves as agents of a
thoroughgoing rejection and transcendence of the old regime.23 As a
consequence, much less than justifying their actions in terms of an older
legality, the Bolsheviks felt themselves free to construct—indeed
historically compelled to construct, according to their ideology—an
entirely new governing system based on a revolutionary conception of law
and public order at its core.24
What, according to Rick, ultimately differentiated the English
revolutionaries of 1688-89 from their Bolshevik counterparts in 1917?
Perhaps less than one might suppose, at least from the ultimate perspective
of law. Despite the hyper-legalist rhetoric of the Glorious Revolution, the
English insurrectionists still engaged in what was, in Rick’s estimation,
fundamentally an extra-legal enterprise. This is entirely in keeping with
Rick’s ultimately Hartian understanding of the foundations of
revolutionary change. For Rick, such change boils down to a “replacement
of one rule of recognition with a distinctly new one.”25 To achieve that
18

Id. at 2.
Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6.
20
Id. at 166.
21
Richard S. Kay, William III and the Legalist Revolution, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1645 (2000).
22
Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS. 31, 46 (2000).
23
Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 166.
24
Id. at 205–06.
25
Kay, Constitutional Change, supra note 6, at 37 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 117–23, 153;
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12; Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6).
19
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goal, however, “mere legal authority would be insufficient even though
such changes might be articulated using the rhetoric of law.”26 Because the
replacement of a rule of recognition goes to the very heart of “some settled
source of legal authority,” the replacement could only be effectuated “from
a point of view external to the legal system . . . based on political history
and morality.”27
In short, from this Hartian perspective, both the English revolutionaries
of 1688-89 and their Bolshevik counterparts in 1917 were engaged in an
ultimately extra-legal insurrection. What differentiated them, rather, was
what Rick would call the prevailing “axiological” environment in which
they operated, i.e., the well of values and experiences—cultural, historical,
social, political—from which they drew, which in turn impelled them
toward revolutionary change.28 In seventeenth-century England, adherence
to law (or the appearance thereof) provided an independent source of
axiological value from which otherwise extra-legal revolutionary impulses
might be dressed up and thereby gain political-cultural traction. In the case
of late-seventeenth century England, “the need to accommodate the law
was not a mere irritant. It was a powerful constraint on what the
revolutionaries did and, certainly, on what they said. The pull of legality
and the shame of illegality were continuous, insistent, and intense.”29
(Precisely because the English revolutionaries felt the need to avoid any
appearance of being lawless, they needed to “fake[] it,” as Rick puts it.)30
By contrast, the Bolsheviks in 1917 felt no similar need for this sort of
legal subterfuge, because the axiological environment in which they
operated gave them license to do so. This was so not just because of the
Bolsheviks’ own utterly rejectionist ideology toward “bourgeois” legality
and the state. Rather, it was also because of the thin—indeed, arguably
non-existent—culture of legality of the Tsarist regime they were seeking to
overthrow.31
To get a better handle on Rick’s understanding of how this sort of
axiological background might influence revolutionary episodes, we can
turn to the opening pages of GRCL, which provide further theoretical
elaboration. As Rick explains there, a revolutionary change in regime—

26

Id.
Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 182 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 89–91, 116–23; Kay,
Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 6).
28
KAY, G LORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17–20 (following Jerzy Wróblewski, The
Analytical Concept of Revolution, in ENLIGHTENMENT, RIGHTS AND REVOLUTION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 374 (Neil MacCormick & Zenon Bankowski eds., 1989)).
29
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 2.
30
Id. at 17.
31
Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 203–08.
27
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legal, political, or otherwise—always requires an antecedent axiological
shift.32 He explains:
The formal rules and institutions of any state are created and
maintained in response to certain substantive social needs.
The stability of formal arrangements will depend on how
well they continue to fit the substantive desiderata. But the
latter derive from social facts and values that are subject to
inevitable change. As they change, the suitability of existing
legal structures may diminish. Sooner or later, that is,
constitutional rules are likely to chafe and the preconditions
for revolution will be in place.33
As Rick further notes, however, there are two factors complicating this
seeming congruence between the axiological and legal/constitutional
manifestations of revolution. The first flows from the fact that,
[i]f constitutions responded perfectly and instantly to altered
social conditions and political convictions, the axiological
and legal marks of revolution would appear simultaneously.
But that is almost never the case. Typically, there will be a
lag during which time the underlying social and political
values remain unsettled while the old constitutional
institutions remain in place.34
This idea of “lag” is in fact well known to theorists of institutional
change. In modern parlance, such lags reflect institutional “stickiness”;35
that is, the remarkable resilience of certain socio-political or socio-legal
arrangements in the face of pressures for change. Pierre Bourdieu, the
French sociologist, called this phenomenon “hysteresis,”36 drawing the
concept from the natural sciences, where it is used to describe dynamic
systems whose outputs are time-dependent on present and past inputs.37
When we apply this idea to the social and political world, it helps us better
understand the relative rarity of outright revolution. For such radical
transformations to occur, there normally needs to be a “critical juncture,”
32
KAY, G LORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19 (“The legal revolution . . . must—sooner or
later—follow the axiological one.”).
33
Id. at 18 (citing Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 22, at 46).
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., Peter J. Boettke, Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, Institutional Stickiness and
the New Development Economics, 67 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 331, 332 (2008) (discussing how certain
institutional arrangements tend to get “lock[ed] in”).
36
See Cheryl Hardy, Hysteresis, in PIERRE BOURDIEU: KEY CONCEPTS 132–34 (Michael Grenfell
ed., 2008) (defining the concept of “hysteresis”).
37
The concept now has a wide range of applications across several scientific fields (notably
physics) as well as engineering and economics. See generally MARK A. KRASNOSEL’SKII & ALEKSEI V.
POKROVSKII, SYSTEMS WITH HYSTERESIS (Marek Niezgódka trans., 1989).
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as the literature puts it; that is, “a rare confluence of functional, political,
and cultural shifts that radically undermine existing institutional
settlements,” which then help to overcome hysteresis “and thereby open[]
the way for genuinely new institutional configurations.”39
As Rick further suggests, however, there is a second potential factor
that, in his view, can complicate the congruence between the axiological
and legal manifestations of revolution. This one flows from the fact that
“legal regularity may itself comprise a significant social-political value” in
certain contexts.40 This adds a twist to Rick’s insistence, following Hart,
that revolutionary change must be effectuated “from a point of view
external to the legal system . . . based on political history and morality.”41
How can the commitment to legal regularity operate in this extra-legal
sense? Rick fully acknowledges this problem:
The awkwardness of any legal revolution in such
circumstances will be apparent. The new system will have to
commend itself to the society, in part, by embracing the value
of fidelity to law. Yet, by definition, it will itself be a breach
of law. Such a revolution subverts its legitimacy by its own
example.42
This awkwardness for Rick summarizes the peculiar character of the
Glorious Revolution: In order “to reconcile those axiological imperatives
with the irresistible culture of legal propriety,”43 the revolutionaries of
late-seventeenth century England needed “to employ the rhetoric, if not the
reality, of legal regularity.”44 This is a somewhat peculiar argument,
depending as it does on a strained, ultimately Hartian distinction between
law and non-law that does not map very well onto the historical record
presented in GRCL or indeed elsewhere. Not only are the realms of law
and non-law not so clearly distinct in revolutionary moments, they are also
deeply interdependent and permeable at all times. Thus, despite his formal
Hartian framing, I would say that Rick is substantively on the right track
when he seeks to understand revolutionary change in terms of a
“reconcil[iation]” between the axiological and the legal45 (or, as my
Hauriou-inflected approach would put it, between the socio-political “real”
38
Giovanni Capoccia, Critical Junctures and Institutional Change, in ADVANCES IN
COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 147–48 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2015).
39
Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 73–74.
40
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19.
41
Kay, Legal Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 182 (citing HART, supra note 6, at 89–91, 116–23; Kay,
Preconstitutional Rules, supra note 6).
42
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19.
43
Id. at 20.
44
Id. at 19.
45
Id.
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and the legal-normative “right”). Nonetheless, we are left to wonder
whether recourse to a different analytical framework might better allow us
to capture the complex dynamic processes that such reconciliation actually
entails.
II. HAURIOU’S INSTITUTIONALIST THEORY AND THE DIMENSIONS OF
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE
To understand how Hauriou’s approach might usefully inform Rick’s
own, we should turn first to Rick’s article Constituent Authority,47 and
examine some of its theoretical implications in more detail. In this piece,
Rick offers a critique of the traditional concept used to identify the
law-maker behind a constitution—“constituent power”—whose drawbacks
compel Rick to offer an alternative concept—“constituent authority”—in
order to capture better what he sees as the realities of the
constitution-making process.48 The entire analysis in Constituent Authority
reflects a profound discomfort with the idea of constituent power as merely
a “raw force, physical, psychological and emotional,”49 referring to a
phenomenon seemingly external to law par excellence. Although the
intellectual sources for this idea are many, Rick often invokes Carl Schmitt
as its most articulate exponent. Rick quotes Schmitt, for example, for the
proposition that the will of the “constitution-making power is existentially
present: its power or authority lies in its being.”50 For Rick, “[t]his cannot
be the whole story.”51 As he elaborates in a crucial passage:
There is always a reason why an attempted assertion of
power is effective. Rules might, for some time, prevail solely
because of the physical might the rule-maker can bring to
bear on the addressees of its rules. But for a successful
constitution to endure for an extended period, there must be
something about it that persuades (or at least permits) its
subjects to submit to it . . . . In the case of a constitution, it
will be essential that there exists an explicit or implicit
determination by some significant part of the population that
the makers of the constitution are or were an appropriate
source of constitutional rules. I use the term “authority” to
underline the fact that successful constitution-making must
46
Cf. Lindseth, Between the ‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 60–63 (describing a
Hauriou-inspired approach for analyzing the “real” and the “right”).
47
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4.
48
Id. at 717–22 (drawing a distinction between “constituent power” and “constituent authority”).
49
Id. at 719.
50
Id. at 721 (quoting CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 64 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans.,
2008)).
51
Id.
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involve something more than the expression of will. It calls
for the “augmentation and confirmation of will by some sort
of reasoning.”52
There are evident traces in this passage of Rick’s emphasis on the
axiological context as a predicate to legal change that we discussed in Part
I. But Rick adds here a skepticism of power and will as adequate in
themselves, within the axiological realm, to precipitate durable and
legitimate constitution-making. For the “reality” of power to effectively
bring about a new realm of “right” expressed in a constitution, there must
be a socio-historical and socio-political identity and legitimacy between
the community and the purported makers of the constitution. There must,
in other words, be a normative and legitimating foundation in the
axiological context. Indeed, this antecedent normative basis to the
transformation of “real” into “right” is reflected directly in the very next
passage in Constituent Authority:
Authority involves an evaluation of the rightness of the
constituent events . . . . This does not make its existence any
less a fact but it is a certain kind of fact, one that includes the
collective critical judgments of some number of individuals
in certain times and places. It is this continuing normative
attitude that distinguishes constituent authority from simple
constituent power.53
These passages provide the basis to demonstrate the overlap between
Rick’s position and Hauriou’s approach, which, as I hope to show in the
subsequent discussion, is in fact profound. Hauriou was similarly critical of
the view (which he associated with “German jurisprudence”) that “equates
law with force . . . . Force becomes law by success. Constituted law is an
attack that has succeeded.”54 An extended quotation of Hauriou’s
subsequent critique of this view is worthwhile:
It is easier to protest against the cynicism of such an outlook
than formally to refute it. At first sight history seems to prove
it. In international conflict and political revolution brutal
conquest has long been responsible for the forcible union of
peoples, and insurrection has given rise to legitimate
government . . . . [However,] [w]e have to analyze with
exactness the events that have occurred. Around an
organization of fact which the process of history has
52
Id. (quoting Carl J. Friedrich, Authority, Reason and Discretion, in AUTHORITY 28, 32 (Carl
Friedrich ed., 1958)) (other citations omitted).
53
Id. at 721–22.
54
Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816.
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institutionalized and made legitimate we have in reality a
succession of phenomena . . . . In the first phase an
organization is created simply by force, and it then desires to
live in peace. But to obtain a peaceful existence the new
organization must obtain pardon for its origin, must modify
itself, must put itself in harmony with the conscience of
jurisprudence. Peaceful existence is possible only when the
demands of law are satisfied. Until that is achieved the
usurper must maintain an armed peace, and an armed peace
is not a peaceful existence. So any organization derived from
force becomes neither institutionalized nor legitimate save
when law has beatified it. Nor does law beatify by reason of
force alone.55
As suggested by this passage, Hauriou discerned an intimate linkage
between institutionalization and the emergence of legitimacy and law. But
the relationship, as I hope to show, is always recursive and reflexive, each
operating on each other in complex ways. Indeed, one might argue that,
while Hauriou viewed constituted law as the culmination of the process,
law itself was inextricably tied to—and ultimately inseparable from—
antecedent processes of institutionalization and the emergence of
legitimacy. Only with all three could “an organization of fact . . . obtain a
peaceful existence.”56
I will outline the particular elements of Hauriou’s theory of the
institution in a moment.57 But allow me to stress first that, among its many
other virtues, Hauriou stressed that it could provide, inter alia, “a
satisfactory explanation of the difficult problem of legitimacy arising from
prescription.”58 “In law, as in history,” he wrote in his 1925 definitive
summation of his theory, “institutions stand for duration, continuity, and
reality; the process of their foundation constitutes the juridical basis of
society and the state.”59 The process involved, Hauriou maintained, a
55

Id.
Id.
57
See infra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
58
Hauriou, An Interpretation of the Principles of Public Law, supra note 10, at 816.
59
Hauriou, The Theory of the Institution and the Foundation, supra note 9, at 93. Hauriou
distinguished between two types of institutions, both relevant for our purposes: “institution-persons”
and “institution-things.” The former refer to social bodies like states, corporations, guilds, associations,
etc., that have come to have legal personality of their own. In this category states hold a unique place,
however, in that only states possess the autonomous capacity to mobilize resources in their own right in
a legitimate and compulsory manner (other social bodies, like corporations or guilds, also require
mobilization of resources from their members but ultimately depend on the state to enforce that
capacity, often through mechanisms of private law, such as contract). Consequently, for most social
bodies short of the state, their character is dependent on what Hauriou called institution-things, or the
juridical rules existing within society, such as property and contract, which borrow the power of
sanction from the state as the ultimate social body in the collectivity. Id. at 99–100 (emphasis added).
56
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complex interaction between “objective” social, political, and historical
forces—what Rick might call the “axiological” context—and “subjective”
exercises of will in pursuance of particular ideas about that context more
broadly. As Hauriou wrote, “the social milieu has only a force of inertia
that finds expression in either a power of reinforcement of individual
proposals when it approves them, or a power of opposition and reaction
when it disapproves them; but of itself it has neither initiative nor power of
creation.”60 For Hauriou, subjective will, motivated by an idea, creates
change when it interacts with those “objective” social, political, and
historical forces.
At the most abstract level, the process of institutionalization, as
Hauriou understood it, involved three elements: “(1) the idea of the work
or enterprise to be realized in a social group; (2) the organized power put at
service of this idea for its realization; (3) the manifestations of communion
that occur within the social group with respect to the idea and its
realization.”61 I would restate the elements of institutionalization in slightly
different terms,62 viewing them instead as sets of variables whose
coordinates, if you will, can be described along three inter-related
dimensions:

60

•

the functional, in which actors seek to respond to
objective demands (‘needs’) presented by their natural or
social environment, subject to functional constraints on
available resources, whether inherent in the human
species or environmental, cultural, or technological;

•

the political, in which actors, while responding to these
functional needs/constraints, struggle over the allocation
of scarce institutional advantages within their collectivity
or beyond, either as to the existing institutional
advantages they seek to preserve or the new ones they
seek to realize;

•

and finally, the cultural, or the realm in which actors
mobilize competing notions of legitimacy (conceptions
of ‘right’), often religiously or legally expressed, either
to justify or to resist changes in institutional and legal
categories/structures in their response to functional
needs/constraints.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 100–01.
62
The reasoning behind this revised approach is set out in greater detail in: Lindseth, Between the
‘Real’ and the ‘Right’, supra note 7, at 63–70.
61
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The complexity of the interplay between these various dimensions is a
principal reason why we observe a large degree of variation in institutional
forms in human evolution—what Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, the
leading institutional theorist of the past half-century, has called the great
“diversity of regularized social behavior that we observe at multiple
scales.”63 The three dimensions of institutional change—functional,
political, and cultural—should always be understood as overlapping and
interpenetrating, with varied and multidirectional causal relationships
operating among them. As a leading comparative historian once rightly
reminded us: “Where a historical problem is big enough to matter,
causation is invariably multiple, the factors intertwined and
interdependent.”64 How a particular society views social and economic
(i.e., “axiological”) demands at any given moment, for example, will
depend significantly on the cultural system of interpretation that is then
dominant, as well as on how competing interests mobilize interpretative
frameworks to serve their political goals. A functional concept like
“[n]eed, to make the obvious point, is subjective, political, time-dependent,
and cultural.”65 Moreover, a functional resource like property (or, indeed,
legality)66 can also operate to define interests in the political dimension
while also constituting an ideology in the cultural dimension.67 Finally,
legitimacy—the seemingly quintessential cultural element of institutional
change (as to both governing structures and legal rules)—can also be
63

ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 6 (2005). Like Ostrom, I seek
to explain this institutional variation by reference to “a universal framework composed of nested sets of
components within components for explaining human behavior.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). See
Elinor Ostrom, Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, 39 POL’Y
STUD. J. 7, 8 (2011) (“The study of institutions depends on theoretical work undertaken at three levels
of specificity that are often confused with one another. These essential foundations are (i) frameworks,
(ii) theories, and (iii) models.”). Further potential linkages between my (Hauriou-inspired) framework
and Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework will need to be explored in
greater detail in another venue. For present purposes, however, it is worth noting the cross-resonance
and potential overlap between the three “external variables” that Ostrom identifies as foundational to
her IAD framework—“biophysical conditions,” “attributes of community,” and “rules-in-use”—and the
three dimensions (functional, political, and cultural) that I identify as fundamental to the process of
institutional change. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of
Complex Economic Systems, Prize Lecture for The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2009 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University (Dec. 8, 2009), in THE NOBEL
PRIZES 414–15 (Karl Grandin ed., 2009), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economicsciences/2009/ostrom/lecture/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
64
DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 200
(1998).
65
Id. at 199.
66
Arguably, as Rick shows in GRCL, legality was such a resource upon which the English
revolutionaries of 1688–89 needed to draw. See supra notes 29–30, 44 and accompanying text.
67
See, e.g., RODGERS, supra note 64, at 200 (referring to “accustomed rights of property” in the
United States playing major roles as both “interests and ideology” in the reception of European models
of social policy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries).
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understood as a functional resource that enables or constrains action in the
political dimension.68
Consequently, if we could truly isolate changes in the functional
dimension from the political or cultural dimensions (which arguably we
cannot), then perhaps we would observe much smoother evolutionary
development in legal and political institutions. Instead, we find the
notorious “stickiness,” which arguably results from the same complex
interplay of functional, political, and cultural factors over time. Economic
or social shifts in the functional dimension may, depending on the array of
interests, trigger either support or resistance in the political dimension.
Moreover, this functional/political interaction will be subject to varying
and potentially contradictory interpretations mobilized in the cultural
dimension. The line of causation will always be multidirectional, and there
is no guarantee that new functional demands—or, for that matter, new
arrays of political interests or even alternative conceptions of legitimacy
that may emerge—will, in themselves, inevitably or inexorably lead to
institutional change.
Indeed, if there is a bias in the system, it is arguably in favor of gradual
change in the intermediate term, which will generally occur within the
confines of a more enduring institutional “settlement” rather than cause
radical change leading to a new “settlement” itself. Of course, sometimes
such radical change does occur, as Rick explores in GRCL. But the more
important point is that, while historical actors are not prisoners of inherited
models and systems of interpretations—they do retain agency69—their
natural inclination has been to seek to understand (i.e., “to reconcile”)70
corresponding shifts in structures of governance in terms of conceptions of
legitimacy that are recognizable in historical and cultural, if still evolving,
terms.71 This process of reconciliation inevitably acts as a drag on the
process of institutional change, an example of Bourdieu’s “hysteresis” in
action.72
The bias against radical institutional change is particularly manifest in
the constitutional domain, a core focus of Rick’s work. But to appreciate
this bias fully, we must break from a narrow and positivistic conception of
a constitution as “an identifiable text or set of texts containing rules at the
68
See, e.g., LINDSETH, supra note 3, at 11 (expanding on legitimacy’s role in institutional
change).
69
As the anthropologist Marshall Sahlins reminds us: “For if there is always a past in the present,
an a priori system of interpretation, there is also a ‘life which desires itself’ (as Nietzsche says).”
MARSHALL SAHLINS, ISLANDS OF HISTORY 152 (1985).
70
See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
71
Cf. Peter L. Lindseth, Reconciling with the Past: John Willis and the Question of Judicial
Review in Inter-War and Post-War England, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 657 (2005); see also LINDSETH,
supra note 3.
72
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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73

highest level of the formal legal hierarchy.” This is Rick’s claimed
approach in Constituent Authority. It allows him, definitionally, to argue
that a range of social and political factors are extra-legal and
extra-constitutional, even as they are nonetheless essential to the ultimate
legitimacy and durability of the constitutional system as a whole.74 The
fact that they are so essential, however, suggests to me that we should not
be using the term “constitutional” in the merely formal sense as an act of
positive law. Rather, we should deploy it in the most robust and
substantive sense, something with strong socio-historical, socio-cultural,
and socio-political underpinnings within a particular community.
Hauriou alluded to these underpinnings when he spoke of
“constitutional superlegality”; that is, “a sort of constitutional legitimacy
that occupies a place above even the written constitution.”75 Rick’s
analysis effectively concurs, even if he insists, very much in a Hartian
vein, that “constituent authority cannot be legal authority.”76 As his
analysis in Constituent Authority shows, the transformation of an
institutional arrangement into something genuinely “constitutional” for a
particular community—that is, the creation of a body or bodies capable of
ruling legitimately and durably on the community’s behalf—requires a
special kind of transformation that inevitably entails a legal-cultural
component.
In the democratic age in which we (hopefully) still find ourselves, this
process is intimately tied to the historical emergence of a sense that a
particular political community, as a collectivity, is “entitled to effective
organs of political self-government”77 through institutions that the
community “constitutes” for this purpose. Crucial in this transition is
collective historical memory, or the manner in which certain institutions
are able to derive legitimacy from their popular association with the certain
critical “moments” in the community’s past.78 This democratic and
constitutional self-consciousness—what we often call the sense of being a
“demos,” “people,” or “nation”—need not be grounded in exclusionary
ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic affinities, nor does it preclude
73

Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 715.
See, e.g., supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
75
Norbert Foulquier, Maurice Hauriou, Constitutionnaliste (1856-1929), 2 JUS POLITICUM 1, 12–
13 (2009) (quoting MAURICE HAURIOU, PRÉCIS DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 296 (1st ed. 1923)
(Lindseth translation), hard-copy downloadable at http://juspoliticum.com/article/Maurice-Hauriouconstitutionnaliste-1856-1929-75.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2020)).
76
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 716.
77
NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH 173 (1999) (Oxford Univ. Press Inc. ed., 1999) (emphasis added).
78
See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Law, History, and Memory: “Republican Moments” and the
Legitimacy of Constitutional Review in France, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 54 (1997). See also, Kay,
Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 742 (on the role of historical memory). Cf. Kay, Constitutional
Chrononomy, supra note 22 (on time and constitution-making).
74
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cooperation with other polities on the basis of reciprocity and
interdependence.
As
Neil
MacCormick
has
shown,
this
demos-consciousness can be “civic”—based in shared ideals—although it
still must be grounded in a “historical” and indeed “cultural” experience
for that particular community.79
It should be noted that Rick expresses some skepticism about the
possibility of “a purely demotic polity, one based solely on loyalty to
shared civic values.”80 In our reading of that sentence, however, we must
place emphasis on the words purely and solely. In GRCL, in fact, Rick’s
entire argument is built around the idea that the prevailing “axiological”
value system in late-seventeenth century England was informed, in
significant part, by loyalty to at least one such civic value—adherence to
law—which then deeply shaped the contours of the ensuing constitutional
revolution.81 Although, as Rick suggests in Constituent Authority, it may
well be impossible to “banish” from the act of constitution-making “the
centrifugal tendency of distinct historical-cultural sympathies,”82 his
account in GRCL suggests that values we now regard as “civic” may well
be part of the “historical” and “cultural” experience for a particular
community, precisely as MacCormick suggested. The only real question
left opened by Rick’s account is not so much whether this value is part of
the axiological context of the Glorious Revolution, but whether (oddly) it
can also be understood as part of the system of “law” or understandings of
“legality” through which the revolutionaries felt bound to pursue their
goals.
III. WHITHER “LAW”?
This brings us back, in closing, to the jarring comment in the opening
chapter of GRCL: that the English revolutionaries of 1688-89, per Rick,
“crammed irregular decisions into the regular forms; they described illegal
actions with legal terminology. In short, they faked it.”83 Or, as he puts it
two pages later, they sought “to employ the rhetoric, if not the reality, of
legal regularity” in bringing about a revolutionary change in regime.84
Viewed from the broader institutionalist perspective outlined in Part II,
Rick appears to be clinging here to an excessively literal understanding of
law and legality in drawing his ultimate conclusions (which, it should be
stressed, are otherwise deeply persuasive). This flows again from his
79

MACCORMICK, supra note 77, at 169–74. See also Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at
740–43.
80
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 743.
81
See supra notes 28–30, 44–46 and accompanying text.
82
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 743.
83
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17.
84
Id. at 19.
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ultimate loyalty to a Hartian framing and its distinction between law and
non-law. As Rick puts it in Constituent Authority, he is insistent that,
“[l]ike it or not, a true constituent authority must act without the comfort of
legal authorization.”85 He acknowledges that “[i]n certain circumstances,
[the] masking of an exercise of constituent authority behind a facade of
legality serves important political interests.”86 Nonetheless, that exercise
will still necessarily—indeed definitionally—be extra-legal in character.
This leads him inexorably to his theoretical and methodological
conclusion: “The absence of a legal answer to the question of who has
constituent authority obliges us to identify a social and/or political one.”87
This separation of the legal from the social and political is not merely
Hartian; it is also driven by Rick’s overarching (dare I say it, “originalist”)
desire to identify specific starting points for legal and constitutional
interpretation.88 He insists: “Like every human phenomenon, a legal
system must have a beginning.”89 Moreover, not only must it have a
beginning, but society and politics must be antecedent to that beginning
rather than be intimately bound up with law in co-constitutive fashion.
Although this approach may make sense from the perspective of a kind
of originalist legal doctrine, it is much more tenuous from the perspectives
of history, sociology, or even anthropology (i.e., the disciplines on which a
more institutionalist approach to law ultimately draws). There may well
have been a point in the very distant past of human development when
functional needs first gave rise to social groupings, in turn precipitating the
advent of an interest-based politics, culminating in cultural conceptions of
legal “right,” both public and private. But once each of these domains first
emerged, they began to influence each other in complex and
multi-directional ways,90 giving rise to the range of social, political, and
legal institutions that, as Hauriou saw, have provided “the juridical basis of
society and the state.”91
Thus, given the extent of this antecedent institutionalization, it is
difficult to maintain that any modern legal system must have an
identifiable “beginning” except in anything more than a formal or technical
sense. As one historical sociologist once rightly observed, “the world is
always already institutionalized. Change unfolds on historically specific
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Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 735.
Id. at 733.
87
Id. at 735.
88
See, e.g., Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, supra note 22, at 31 (in applying a rule of law, one
must look to the creation of it).
89
Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 4, at 735.
90
See supra notes 62–72 and accompanying text (discussing the “elements of
institutionalization”).
91
Hauriou, supra note 8, at 93.
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terrain . . .” (of which, implicitly, conceptions of law and legality will
always be a part). We cannot escape the inherited institutional and legal
constructions of that terrain, including in our analysis of politics and
society. Rather, it is through these constructions—and perhaps more
importantly, through the cultural process of internalizing their seeming
normative demands over time (whether explicitly or implicitly)—that we
claim (hope) to live in a society governed by the “rule of law” rather than
by the whims of power and force.
Hauriou is again helpful in spelling out for us the implications of this
more institutionalist approach. When he spoke of how an “organization of
fact . . . must obtain pardon for its origin, must modify itself, must put
itself in harmony with the conscience of jurisprudence,”93 he was in fact
referring to the inescapability of antecedent legal conceptions in shaping
the processes of institutionalization and legitimation. For Hauriou, this is
the role of “law” writ large, to institutionalize, legitimize, and grant such
an organization a “peaceful existence.”94 This “law” is revealed socially
and culturally, in the continuing process of historical development
manifested in the balance of forces that society realizes in itself over time.
This explains why—beyond the “idea” and the “organized power” in
service of that idea—Hauriou added the third element in the process of
institutionalization: “manifestations of communion that occur within the
social group with respect to the idea and its realization.”95 It is through
these “manifestations of communion” that a social group takes a kind of
ownership of an organization of fact (whether created by political force or
in response to functional demand). This ownership becomes part of the
group’s identity. It is through this process of internalization and
identification that a social legitimacy emerges, one that truly allows the
“real” to be viewed as “right” for that particular community. The forms of
law play a crucial role here, because, as Hauriou maintains, institutions are
fundamentally both historical and legal constructions—they are “born, live,
and die” through acts of foundation, administration, and/or dissolution that
the community experiences, in a cultural sense, as having a specifically
legal effect.96
In this sense, the English revolutionaries of 1688-89 were not, to return
to Rick’s phrase, really “fak[ing]” it at all.97 Rather, they were engaged in a
process of reshaping conceptions of “right” in the cultural dimension, a
92

Elisabeth S. Clemens, Rereading Skowronek: A Precocious Theory of Institutional Change, 27
SOC. SCI. HIST. 443, 446 (2003).
93
Hauriou, supra note 10, at 816.
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Id.
95
See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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Hauriou, supra note 9, as translated in THE FRENCH INSTITUTIONALISTS, supra note 8, at 100.
97
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 17.
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process that is inherent in the process of “reconciliation.” As the cultural
historian Sarah Hanley once succinctly put it:
[T]he historical process [is] a renewable dialogue or cultural
conversation, wherein history is culturally ordered by
existing concepts, or schemes of meaning, at play in given
times and places; and culture is historically ordered when
schemes of meaning are revalued and revised as persons act
and reenact them over time. One might regard this process of
reordering as one that “counterfeits culture”; that is, as a
process that replicates a perceived original but at the same
time (consciously or unconsciously) forges something quite
new.99
The reason something new inevitably emerges out of this process of
replication is that the process itself is always imperfect. Sometimes actors
intentionally pursue a “counterfeit” law or politics but usually not; rather
they are normally engaged in a sincere effort to express a genuine, if
evolving, legal and political identity in the face of new social and political
pressures. “Reconciliation” is unavoidable even to the most committed
originalist.
The commitment to legal continuity was undoubtedly central to the
identity of the English revolutionaries of 1688-89, and out of their efforts
to displace James with William emerged a broadly legitimate regime in the
eyes of an overwhelmingly Protestant population. Although there remained
not-insignificant pockets of Jacobite resistance at the periphery,100 the
revolutionary effort at the core (including the purportedly “fake” legal
continuity) undoubtedly contributed to building a greatly reinforced
governing system. With that augmented legitimacy, the new regime would
dramatically increase its capacity to mobilize fiscal and human resources
and thus to project power much more expansively, both in Europe and
indeed throughout the world, over the next century.101
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See supra notes 44–46, 70–72 and accompanying text.
Sarah Hanley, Engendering the State: Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern
France, 16 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 4, 5–6 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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In Scotland, there would be periodic Jacobite rebellions well into the next century. Moreover,
in Ireland, following the Williamite War of 1688–91, the Protestant Ascendancy would need to
maintain, in effect, “an armed peace,” to borrow the pertinent phrasing from Hauriou, the effects of
which Ireland is still living with today. Hauriou, supra note 10, at 816.
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See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 830
(1989) (“It is clear that the institutional changes of the Glorious Revolution permitted the drive toward
British hegemony and dominance of the world.”); but see Steven C. A. Pincus & James A. Robinson,
What Really Happened During the Glorious Revolution?, in INSTITUTIONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
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The achievement of the Glorious Revolution stands in contrast with
some prominent revolutions of the twentieth century that were less
fastidious in “employ[ing] the rhetoric, if not the reality, of legal
regularity.”102 The Bolshevik Revolution, which Rick touches on in Legal
Rhetoric and Revolutionary Change,103 was no doubt able to
institutionalize itself sufficiently to support a dictatorial regime that would
last over seventy years. But its ultimate collapse arguably owed as much to
the cynicism and lack of legitimacy flowing from its rejection of
“bourgeois legality” (and the many abuses both large and small that this
engendered) as from the regime’s inability to meet the material needs of its
population.
A second twentieth-century revolution would be the Nazi seizure of
power in Germany in 1933, followed by its utterly failed effort to establish
a “Thousand-Year Reich,” lasting a mere twelve years. Carl Schmitt, who
joined the Nazi Party after the seizure in 1933, famously attempted to dress
up the violence of the Nazi state with a patina of legality.104 But leaving
aside its colossal criminality and brutality, “the Hitler regime,” as one of its
foremost historians has noted, would prove to be “inimical to a rational
order of government and administration. Its hallmark was systemlessness,
administrative and governmental disorder, the erosion of clear patterns of
government, however despotic.”105
In 1944, surrounded by the evidence of the resulting catastrophe for
Europe and the world, Schmitt offered a set of reflections on the “plight”
of European jurisprudence.106 Taking refuge, in part, in French legal
doctrine (notably that of Hauriou),107 he wrote of the necessity for “a sense
for the logic and consistency of concepts and institutions,” a “minimum of
an orderly procedure, due process, without which there can be no law,” as
well as “a recognition of the individual based on mutual respect.”108
Although Schmitt had long claimed inspiration from Hauriou’s

eds., 2014) (critiquing the North and Weingast interpretation). More generally, see JOHN BREWER, THE
SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY, AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 1688–1783 (1988).
102
KAY, GLORIOUS REVOLUTION, supra note 12, at 19.
103
See supra notes 19–27 and accompanying text.
104
See, e.g., Carl Schmitt, Der Führer schützt das Recht (The Leader Protects the Law), 39
DEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 945 (1934).
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IAN KERSHAW, ‘Working towards the Führer’: Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler
Dictatorship, in HITLER, THE GERMANS, AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 29, 35 (2008).
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Carl Schmitt, The Plight of European Jurisprudence, TELOS, Spring 1990, at 35, 44 (G.L.
Ulmen, trans.). This essay originally appeared as CARL SCHMITT, Die Lage der europäischen
Rechtswissenschaft (1943/44), in VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE AUFSÄTZE AUS DEN JAHREN 1924-1954:
MATERIALIEN ZU EINER VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 386–426 (2d ed. 1973).
107
See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 106, at 52, 68 n.74.
108
Id. at 67.
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institutional theory, his Nazi episode showed how he shared none of the
French professor’s commitment to constitutionalism grounded in
separation of powers or the protection of individual rights.110 Schmitt even
had the audacity to argue that it was now necessary to “defend this
indestructible core of all law against all destructive enactments,” a task
“which today in Europe is more critical than at any other time and in any
other part of the world.”111 One can only laugh even if otherwise
overwhelmed by disgust by Schmitt’s self-serving cynicism.
Rather than be taken in by that cynicism, however, we can instead see
it as “the tribute that vice customarily pays to virtue,” to borrow roughly
contemporaneous phrasing from an American historian.112 One hopes that
there is indeed such an “indestructible core of law,” whose continuity
should be defended and preserved during all upheavals, revolutionary or
otherwise. As Rick so ably describes, the English revolutionaries of
1688-89 felt a “pull of legality” and “shame of illegality” that “were
continuous, insistent, and intense.”113 Thank goodness they felt the
necessity to “fak[e] it” in this way,114 because it set a good example for
future revolutions to emulate, even if many have not, with disastrous
consequences.
CONCLUSION
I can only close by thanking Rick again for the richness and
sophistication of his work, and in particular for GRCL and Constituent
Authority, the two pieces on which I focus here. Not only has Rick been, as
I noted at the outset of this Essay, a model of academic citizenship and a
source of wise counsel over many decades, he has also been a model of a
scholarly life well lived. My only regret is that our different “epistemic
communities”115 have kept us from engaging with each other’s work in
greater depth over our two decades on the faculty together. My hope is that
this Essay can be the start of many more fruitful exchanges in the years to
come. I am greatly looking forward to them.
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